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Markus von Fuchs advises in intellectual property law, in particular in competition, patent, and trademark law as well as on the protection of know-how. He advises companies on protecting and commercially exploiting intellectual property, for example through licensing, sales, R&D, and cooperation agreements. He also focuses on the judicial and extrajudicial defense of intellectual property rights in interim injunction and principal proceedings. He further advises on border seizing procedures, initiates and advises on criminal measures relating to product and brand piracy, and on the infringement of business and business secrets. Markus von Fuchs also advises many companies on developing and introducing new technologies and business models. He has particular expertise in the optical and medical technology sectors.
Norbert Klingner specializes in national and international movie/TV and advertising film production, financing, insurance, and distribution. He represents well-known producers, distributors, global distributors, and movie financing entities. His expertise ranges from negotiating and drafting contracts from the beginning of the material development to all matters related to production and financing up to the strategically correct exploitation and licensing. A selection of the film productions in which Mr. Klingner was involved can be found on the Internet Movie Database IMDb.
Margret Knitter is a partner at SKW Schwarz and a Certified Specialist in Intellectual Property Law. She has more than 25 years of experience advising and representing German and international clients on intellectual property matters, with a particular focus on patent, trademark, design and unfair competition law.
A key focus of her practice is IP litigation and enforcement. She represents clients in patent infringement proceedings before the German civil courts and the Unified Patent Court (UPC). She also handles complex trademark, design and unfair competition disputes and advises on cross-border IP litigation.
In trademark and design law, she advises companies on developing, managing and enforcing their IP portfolios internationally.
Another core area of her practice is unfair competition and advertising law, particularly in relation to digital business models, social media, influencer marketing, artificial intelligence and environmental advertising claims (green claims). She also has extensive experience advising on product labelling and regulatory compliance.
Margret Knitter heads the Medical Cannabis Focus Group at SKW Schwarz. She advises companies in the cannabis industry on advertising, distribution, regulatory compliance and market access.
Her approach combines extensive litigation experience with strategic thinking and commercial awareness. She delivers pragmatic, business-oriented solutions to complex domestic and cross-border legal challenges.
Dr. Matthias Nordmann advises international groups, mid cap companies, investors and entrepreneurs on company, commercial and corporate law in particular on structuring and mergers & acquisitions. He has a special focus on transactions in IP/IT driven industries as well as real estate.
Dr. Andreas Peschel-Mehner has provided legal counsel to all forms of digital business since the inception of the world wide web. His advisory spans start-ups, multi-channel offerings and international internet companies and focuses on all applicable legal fields with a particular emphasis on data protection and usage, terms and conditions, consumer protection, compliance, advertising, gaming and competition law, among numerous others. Dr. Andreas Peschel-Mehner also commands broad expertise in media and entertainment law, in particular issues touching on the film and television industry and those related to media production finance and the global exploitation thereof, with digital media advisory on changes to utilization models, revenue streams and video on demand platforms composing a significant part of his counsel.
An excerpt of the projects Dr. Andreas Peschel-Mehner has accompanied can be found on the Internet Movie Database IMDb. His advisory expertise is augmented by decades of involvement with and counsel of national and international computer game publishers and studios. Finally, developments and use of KI technologies across all his expert areas has become a strategic element of his practice.
Legal expertise – digitally sophisticated
Stefan Schicker has been advising clients at the intersection of law, technology, and innovation for over 20 years. As an experienced and award-winning lawyer specializing in IT and IP law, he assists national and international companies in the legally compliant design of digital business models – from the design of complex internet platforms to the protection of intellectual property.
One of Stefan Schicker's special areas of expertise is the legal structuring of corporate influencer initiatives: with specially developed workshops, he supports companies in setting up corporate LinkedIn communication in a legally compliant and effective manner – in accordance with copyright, personality rights, competition law, etc. – More information.
Legal tech & law firm development – with leadership experience
In parallel to his legal practice, Stefan Schicker is one of the most prominent legal tech experts in the German-speaking world. As former COO and CEO of SKW Schwarz, he played a key role in shaping the digital transformation of the law firm – from strategy to operational implementation.
Today, he supports law firms and legal departments in establishing and expanding modern structures:
- Development and introduction of AI-supported tools
- Establishing internal teams of experts and training concepts
- Change processes for the sustainable anchoring of digital working methods
- Organization of law firms as companies
Stefan Schicker brings a unique combination of legal depth, technological experience, and operational law firm management to the table – recognized, among other things, as one of the “Top 3 Legal Leaders of the Year” (Best of Legal Awards).
For companies and law firms that don't want to wait for the future
Whether companies with digital business models or law firms undergoing change: Stefan Schicker combines legal certainty with entrepreneurial foresight – and makes complex transformations understandable, feasible, and effective – More information.
News
Cannabis Telemedicine in Germany: Regulation, Market Entry, Advertising and Enforcement
How is the regulatory landscape for telemedicine evolving in Germany's medical cannabis market? What legal requirements apply to prescriptions, cross-border business models and advertising?
Our partners Margret Knitter, Head of Medical Cannabis, and Dr Oliver Stöckel, Head of Digital Health, address these questions in a guest article published by the international industry platform Business of Cannabis.
Entitled “Cannabis Telemedicine in Germany: Regulation, Market Entry, Advertising and Enforcement”, the article examines the complex legal framework governing telemedicine platforms and providers in the medical cannabis sector. Key topics include the regulatory requirements for telemedical treatment, cross-border services within the EU, advertising restrictions and recent legal developments in Germany.
The article provides practical insights into the opportunities and legal challenges facing companies operating in or seeking to enter the German medical cannabis market.
Read the full article on Business of Cannabis here.
AI Regulation Worldwide: Key Legal Requirements Businesses Need to Know
Artificial intelligence regulation is evolving rapidly around the world, with significant differences between jurisdictions. For internationally active businesses, understanding the legal requirements governing the development, marketing and use of AI technologies across different markets is becoming increasingly important.
The latest edition of Lexology Panoramic Next: Artificial Intelligence 2026 provides a comparative overview of AI regulation worldwide. Legal experts from 20 jurisdictions examine key legislative and regulatory developments, recent case law and practical challenges surrounding the use of artificial intelligence. The guide helps businesses compare different regulatory approaches and better assess legal risks associated with cross-border operations.
Martin Böttger, Johannes Schäufele and Moritz Mehner of SKW Schwarz authored the Germany chapter. Their contribution examines, among other topics, the implementation of the EU AI Act, data protection and AI governance requirements, recent developments in copyright law, as well as liability and contractual considerations relating to AI systems.
The publication is particularly relevant for internationally active businesses, AI developers and technology providers, as well as legal and compliance professionals.
Full publication: Artificial Intelligence: Panoramic Next - Lexology
Germany chapter: Germany - Lexology
KI-Flash: What advertisers and agencies are responsible for when booking ads in AI assistants
Since 24 August 2026, ads have been shown in ChatGPT in Germany to users of the free version and the Go plan. Since 31 August 2026, companies based in Germany, Austria and Switzerland can also book them themselves through the provider’s ads manager, which is in beta. The existing routes through the provider’s ads solutions team and through agency and technology partners remain available. The two previous articles in this series dealt with the provider’s obligations. This article changes sides and asks what the booking party is responsible for itself.
There is hardly any literature on this question yet. That is due to the novelty of the channel and to the fact that public attention is focused on the provider. For companies, the booking side is nonetheless the more pressing one in practice. The provider’s obligations are met by the provider. In case of doubt, nobody else will meet the advertiser’s obligations.
At a glance
- Anyone placing an ad in an AI assistant is, in principle, responsible for labelling it and should record how it is actually delivered.
- Infringements by an agency could be attributed to the client without any possibility of exculpation. An approval process, documentation and the question of who holds the ad account should therefore be laid down in the contract.
- Anyone who leaves a default setting for automatic adjustment of ad texts switched on will not be able to blame the machine when it comes to responsibility for the delivered text. In regulated sectors, the consequences can extend to criminal liability.
- Anyone using the provider’s pixel for measurement could be a joint controller with the provider in that respect.
- The provider’s category exclusions do not replace a review of the sector-specific advertising bans.
Does the advertiser have to label the ad itself?
Section 5a(4) of the German Act against Unfair Competition (UWG) applies to anyone who fails to disclose the commercial purpose of their own commercial practice. An advertiser placing an ad is therefore, in principle, subject to the provision in its own right and should not rely on the platform to label the ad correctly. The same applies to No. 11 of the Annex to Section 3(3) UWG. It covers editorial-looking content used for sales promotion, paid for by the trader and disguised as information. That use will usually be paid for by the advertiser, regardless of who implements the labelling technically.
In practice, this creates a documentation burden. How the ad is actually labelled in the delivery environment and set apart from the answer text should be recorded with a date. If the provider changes the format, the basis of the advertiser’s own assessment changes without the advertiser being informed.
Who is liable when the agency books?
In Germany, purchasing initially ran exclusively through agency and technology partners, and a large share is likely to continue doing so. This raises the question of whom the obligations apply to. The advertiser is the party whose sales are promoted. Infringements by the agency could therefore be attributed to the client under Section 8(2) UWG, without any possibility of exculpation by showing careful selection and supervision.
The agency is also liable for its own contributions under general principles. If it designs the ad or contributes to it, it is liable as a primary infringer. Checking the ad for compliance with competition law then also forms part of its contractual obligations towards the client. A media agency that merely places advertising without knowing its content, by contrast, is only liable for infringements that can be recognised with reasonable effort.
Against attribution, it can be argued that the agency is not an agent within the meaning of Section 8(2) UWG if it has no latitude over the content. Case law on affiliates requires decisive influence on the context, type and content of the advertising. If the agency runs the ad account in the client’s name and for the client’s account, that in principle points towards integration.
Whether Section 8(2) UWG also applies to the provider of the ad system is less clear than it first appears. The agent must be integrated into the business organisation, and the business owner must have decisive and enforceable influence over it. In ordinary advertising business, this should be lacking between the advertiser and the publisher. The publisher is, however, an agent if the advertiser has given it creative latitude. That is exactly the issue here. Leaving the default setting for automatic text adjustment switched on gives the provider creative latitude over the ad text. That speaks for treating this constellation differently from ordinary advertising business.
What should be agreed in the contract
When drafting the contract, the client should provide for an approval process for the text in the version that is actually delivered, documentation of this approval and a provision on who holds the ad account. The last point seems technical, but it also determines the allocation of roles under data protection law and access to the campaign data after the contract ends. Indemnity clauses only take effect between the parties. Externally, the client remains responsible, which is why the agreed labelling should also be monitored and, if necessary, enforced.
Who is liable for automatically rewritten ad text?
Practitioners report that ad systems automatically adjust submitted ad texts, in some cases through an active default setting. Whether and to what extent this happens in the German market needs to be examined in each case.
The legal question can be asked independently of this. Where an ad system changes the submitted text before delivery, it has to be clarified whose commercial practice the delivered text is. The answer is likely to depend also on whether the advertiser triggered the change and whether it can approve the delivered version before it goes live.
Case law on keyword advertising already provides a standard for this, and it fits the case more closely than it first appears. According to the judgment of the Federal Court of Justice of 13 December 2012 (I ZR 217/10), anyone who chooses the standard option for broadly matching keywords has also selected the keywords added by the algorithm for their advertising purposes. An activated default setting that adjusts the submitted ad text is likely to be comparable.
The limit, in turn, is shown by a decision of the Higher Regional Court of Schleswig of 28 September 2017 (6 U 18/17): if the search engine operator’s algorithm independently links a third party’s trade mark, the party ordering the ad has not made an adequately causal contribution. From the point at which it is notified of the infringement, however, that party is liable as an interferer (Störer), because a check can reasonably be expected of it. The dividing line should therefore run along the foreseeability of the change and the point in time at which the advertiser becomes aware of it.
Case law on automatically generated content provides further support. In the contract document generator case, the Federal Court of Justice held in its judgment of 9 September 2021 (I ZR 113/20) that programming software and the results it produces cannot be split into separate processes but are dependent parts of a single activity. The decision concerns the generation of content, not the modification of a submitted text, so applying it to the present case remains our own assessment.
The change is at the same time a commercial practice of the provider. According to case law, anyone who initiates an automated evaluation acts within the scope of their own commercial communication, and the activity is not purely technical and passive if the content is generated by their own program. For the booking party, this means that it does not stand alone. In practice, the question thus shifts to the contract with the provider and whether it provides for recourse.
In areas where the wording determines whether advertising is permissible, this is not a theoretical consideration. Within the scope of the German Healthcare Advertising Act (HWG), a single reworded claim of efficacy can decide whether the entire advertisement is permissible. Section 3 sentence 2 no. 1 HWG prohibits attributing to a remedy a therapeutic effect that it does not have, and the advertiser must demonstrate and prove the scientific basis of the claim. How the text came about is irrelevant. Infringements of Section 3 HWG are also a criminal offence under Section 14 HWG. Where the automatic function can be switched off, there is therefore a good case for switching it off. Where it cannot, regular checks of the delivered version remain necessary.
Responsibility for measurement
If the advertiser uses one of the provider’s measurement tools on its own website, it is processing data itself. Section 25 of the German Telecommunications Digital Services Data Protection Act (TDDDG) applies to access to information on terminal equipment, for the party that initiates the access. The fact that the provider’s pixel sets a cookie on the advertiser’s own domain does not change the need for consent, because the provision does not distinguish between first and third parties. Section 25 TDDDG does not, by contrast, apply to server-side transmission via the conversion interface, because there is no access to terminal equipment; the GDPR alone is the yardstick in this respect. This applies only insofar as no values are passed on that were previously read from the terminal device, such as the click identifier stored in the cookie.
The allocation of roles under the GDPR depends on who determines the purposes and means of processing. Anyone who merely selects a targeting logic specified by the provider decides less than someone who contributes their own data. According to OpenAI’s documentation, advertisers currently cannot upload their own customer lists for campaigns targeting the European Economic Area or Switzerland, because personalised advertising is not yet offered there. This speaks against joint controllership for audience building.
The opposite applies to measurement. In Fashion ID, according to the judgment of the CJEU of 29 July 2019 (C-40/17), integrating a third-party measurement tool is already enough to establish joint controllership for the collection and transmission of the data, because the website operator enables it and has its own economic interest in it. Joint controllership ends where the provider further processes the data, since the advertiser has no decisive influence over that. The allocation of roles must therefore be determined phase by phase and not for the campaign as a whole.
Case law on advertising in social networks is the starting point for the assessment, but it cannot simply be transferred, because there the target group was formed on the basis of characteristics determined by the advertiser itself.
One point is regularly underestimated in practice: measurement data is personal data, and hashed identifiers are pseudonymised and therefore still personal data. It is unresolved whether their transmission also constitutes processing of special categories of data under Art. 9 GDPR where conclusions about health or other sensitive characteristics can be drawn from the context.
An environment without a results list
Anyone advertising in a classic search environment appears next to results that the operator conveys. In an AI assistant, the ad appears in between text that the Munich Regional Court I and the Commission on Licensing and Supervision of the German media authorities (ZAK) have attributed to the provider as its own statement. Neither decision is final; the previous article in this series discusses them. For the advertiser, this shifts the risk profile. The text next to its ad may be incorrect and is at the same time attributable to a provider that has to answer for it.
In addition, according to the provider’s information, placement in a specific conversation is not guaranteed. Delivery is apparently steered through context hints that describe conversational situations, topics or keywords; they do not guarantee delivery in specific conversations. Traditional placement exclusions can therefore only be reproduced to a limited extent. What remains to be clarified contractually is which response channels exist if an answer next to the ad is incorrect or damaging to reputation, and whether the advertiser can demand that delivery be suspended.
Sector-specific advertising bans and the provider’s category exclusions
Sector-specific advertising bans continue to apply unchanged in the AI environment, in particular:
- the HWG for remedies,
- Section 5 of the Interstate Treaty on Gambling (GlüStV) for gambling,
- the Securities Trading Act (WpHG) and MiFID II for financial instruments,
- the Tobacco Products Act (TabakerzG) for tobacco products,
- the Food Information to Consumers Regulation and the Health Claims Regulation for food, and
- the Price Indication Ordinance (PAngV) for price indications.
Their application in the AI environment does, however, have one particular feature. Ad selection depends on the topic of the ongoing conversation. A user describing symptoms is therefore the normal case of audience building, not an edge case. What would be wasted coverage in a traditional environment is how the system works here.
The provider’s category exclusions are contractual requirements. They do not cover the statutory limits.
Four examples show how different the requirements are. Section 5(2) GlüStV prohibits advertising that gives the impression of being editorial content, which is an obvious risk next to an AI answer. Section 19(3) TabakerzG prohibits advertising for tobacco products in information society services and therefore also in an AI assistant service. The Health Claims Regulation works with positive lists, so any health claim that has not been authorised is inadmissible, even if it only arises through automated adjustment. And under Section 1 PAngV, the price must remain clearly allocated to the offer and easily recognisable, which has to be checked specifically where the ad text has been changed.
Elsewhere, the exclusions go further than the law: according to the advertising policies (as of 10 September 2026), regulated industries outside the United States are in part completely excluded from booking. Advertising for legal services is currently completely excluded outside the United States; the same applies to health and financial services, with individual exceptions that apply only in the United States. For companies in these sectors, the assessment therefore begins with the question of access.
Brands in the ad environment
By judgment of 1 June 2026 (52 O 62/26), the Berlin Regional Court II rejected an application by a perfume group. The court held that there was no use as a trade mark under Art. 9 EUTMR, because the search engine operator was creating a new format for search results and was not engaging in its own commercial communication. These are interim injunction proceedings, and the decision is not final.
The reasoning does not, however, support an application to advertising. The court relied on the fact that the texts reflected the actual search results, that every statement was backed by a link to a search result, and that no targeted selection or steering in favour of individual providers was apparent. These three features are missing in paid ad selection. Paying for placement brings about steering in favour of a single provider, and the ad text is not backed by any organic search result.
The Berlin line cannot be relied on for attribution to the advertiser in any event. It concerns whether the operator creates its own format, not whether a booked ad is the advertiser’s commercial communication. There is still no ruling from the highest courts on the operator’s own liability.
What remains open
Above all, what remains unresolved for this channel is the attribution of the delivered ad text. German competition law regulates the attribution of agents’ conduct to the business owner in Section 8(2) UWG. It has no specific rule for the case where an ad system changes the advertiser’s text. Until this is resolved, the practical rule is: Anyone who leaves the automatic function switched on and does not check the delivered version will not be able to blame the machine.
We would be pleased to support you in reviewing your campaigns in the AI environment, in designing agency agreements and approval processes, and in assessing the allocation of roles under data protection law.
Further reading:
- 6 October (Part 2): ChatGPT as a very large online search engine under the Digital Services Act
- 21 September (Part 1): Advertising Law and Data Protection as Ads Launch in ChatGPT
Cannabis Telemedicine in Germany: Navigating the Legal Landscape
The provision of medical cannabis through telemedicine services creates new opportunities for patients. At the same time, it presents providers, platforms and treating physicians with complex legal requirements.
Margret Knitter, LL.M., Partner at SKW Schwarz, has analysed the key developments in a contributed article for the US-based trade publication Cannabis & Tech Today.
The article focuses on the requirements for prescribing medical cannabis via telemedicine, physicians’ professional independence and the specific requirements applicable to cross-border services within the European Union.
Advertising law is of particular importance. Under Section 9 of the German Healthcare Advertising Act (HWG), advertising for remote treatment is generally permitted only under certain conditions. In addition, Section 10 HWG generally prohibits advertising prescription-only medicines to the general public, including medical cannabis. Broad promises of a straightforward online prescription may therefore give rise to legal risks.
Planned amendments to the German Medical Cannabis Act could also have a significant impact on the industry. Among other things, they would require in-person consultations before prescribing cannabis flowers and introduce restrictions on mail-order dispensing. The amendments have not yet been adopted.
In her full article in Cannabis & Tech Today, Margret Knitter explains the requirements applicable to telemedicine-based medical cannabis services in Germany, outlines the key legal developments and discusses their implications for providers and platforms.
AI Retrofits in Manufacturing: When Do Operators Become Manufacturers?
Many production machines are mechanically far from reaching the end of their service life. Digitally, however, they are often no longer up to date. Instead of replacing an entire system, companies retrofit it with cameras, sensors and AI systems.
This can be economically attractive. However, modifying a machine can also cause a company to assume additional manufacturer responsibilities. Anyone who purchases a finished machine and uses it as intended is generally considered its operator. Anyone who makes substantial modifications to it may become a manufacturer themselves.
When Robots Learn to See
An example of what an AI retrofit can look like is an application at Stellantis described by the New York Times. An older industrial robot at a plant in Detroit had difficulty picking up body parts when they were not positioned exactly where expected. Instead of replacing it, the robot was retrofitted with a camera, a computing unit and an AI system.
The system detects the position and orientation of the component and sends corrected coordinates to the robot. The robot can then adapt its movement accordingly. The technical operation is also described in a supplementary publication by the provider Inbolt.
Here, AI improves the production process. However, its outputs also influence the machine's movements. This raises the question of the potential safety consequences of incorrect detection.
AI can also be used specifically to protect people. This approach is being investigated in the Fraunhofer PROTECT project. The camera-based system distinguishes people from automated guided vehicles and enables the robot's speed to be adjusted according to the situation. AI-based recognition is combined with conventional motion detection.
PROTECT therefore illustrates another potential application in which AI is directly integrated into the safety concept. Whether implementing this approach on an existing machine would constitute a substantial modification would need to be assessed separately.
For a retrofit, the decisive factor is not simply which technology is added. What matters is how it changes the machine's behaviour and which protective measures are consequently required.
When Does an Operator Become a Manufacturer?
The EU Machinery Regulation, which applies from 20 January 2027, defines when a subsequent modification is considered substantial. This requires a physical or digital modification that was not envisaged or planned by the original manufacturer and that creates a new hazard or increases an existing risk. In addition, the modification must make additional safeguards, whether physical or non-physical, necessary, with their integration requiring an adjustment to the existing safety control system. Alternatively, additional protective measures must be necessary to ensure stability or mechanical strength. Not every change to a movement sequence or safety function meets these criteria.
For an AI retrofit, it must therefore be assessed on a case-by-case basis whether incorrect detection could trigger hazardous movements, whether the existing safety concept already addresses these risks and which additional protective measures are necessary.
Based on the publicly available information, it is not possible to determine whether the Stellantis retrofit meets these criteria. The legal assessment of such a modification requires a risk assessment of the specific case.
If a substantial modification has been made, the person carrying it out is considered the manufacturer of the modified machine. This may be the existing operator. If a system integrator is commissioned to carry out a substantial modification, the actual division of responsibilities is decisive.
The New Role Brings New Obligations
The new manufacturer must ensure the conformity of the modified machine under its own responsibility. This includes the risk assessment, technical documentation and the applicable conformity assessment procedure, including the EU Declaration of Conformity and CE marking.
Implementation can be particularly complex for older systems. If technical documents, information about the control architecture or the necessary access rights are missing, the modification may only be possible to assess and document with the support of the original manufacturer. In addition to the camera, software and integration, companies must also plan for safety evidence and potential delays before the machine can be put back into operation.
How the AI Act Comes into Play
Not every AI system used in a production facility qualifies as high-risk AI. For product-related systems, classification generally requires that the AI is a safety component or constitutes a product covered by the relevant legislation, and that the product is subject to a conformity assessment by an independent body.
For machinery, the current version of the AI Act contains a special provision. The general high-risk requirements and provider obligations do not apply directly to these product-related systems in the same way as they do to other high-risk AI systems. An AI retrofit therefore does not automatically make the operator a provider under Article 25 of the AI Act as well.
Instead, the intention is to incorporate the relevant AI requirements into the Machinery Regulation through supplementary legal acts. These must become applicable by 2 August 2028. For retrofits, manufacturer responsibility for the modified machine therefore remains the central starting point.
Practical Advice for Operators and System Integrators
Before commissioning a third party to carry out an AI retrofit, companies should document the machine's existing condition, the planned modification and the safety functions affected. This provides a basis for determining whether the modification is substantial and who will assume the resulting manufacturer obligations.
The contract should clearly specify who is responsible for the safety assessment and any conformity assessment that may be required. Responsibilities under public law cannot be freely reassigned by contract. However, the support the company needs to fulfil its obligations should be secured in a binding agreement before the modification begins.
Digital Business 2027: SKW Schwarz provides insights into the legal framework in Germany
Digital business knows no borders. Legal requirements, however, vary from country to country. For companies offering digital products and services internationally or looking to enter new markets, understanding these differences is essential.
This is where Lexology Panoramic: Digital Business 2027 comes in. The international publication provides an overview of the legal requirements for digital business across different jurisdictions. Using a consistent set of questions, it allows readers to compare legal frameworks and identify key differences between markets.
SKW Schwarz has once again authored the Germany chapter. Franziska Ladiges, Matthias Orthwein, Stefan Peintinger, Johannes Schäufele and Daniel Meßmer provide a comprehensive overview of the legal landscape for digital businesses in Germany. They were supported by Fabian Bauer, Corinna Schneiderbauer, Veronika Gelser, Moritz Mehner, Thomas Hausbeck, Maximilian König and Oliver Bühr.
The chapter covers a broad range of topics, from e-commerce, digital contracts and platform regulation to data protection, intellectual property, artificial intelligence and cybersecurity. It also addresses recent developments in European digital regulation, including the EU AI Act, Data Act, Cyber Resilience Act and NIS2, and explains what these requirements mean for businesses operating in Germany.
Through its contribution to the Germany chapter, SKW Schwarz brings its cross-practice expertise in advising digital and technology-driven businesses to this international legal comparison.
Read the Germany chapter of Lexology Panoramic: Digital Business 2027: click here
Handelsblatt Ranking: SKW Schwarz wins “Law Firm of the Year” award in Media Law
Best Lawyers and Handelsblatt have identified “Germany’s Best Law Firms 2026” – and we are delighted: SKW Schwarz has been named “Law Firm of the Year” in the field of Media Law.
What makes this especially rewarding is the fact that the rankings are based on Best Lawyers’ peer‑to‑peer principle. The decisive factor is how often law firms are recommended by other legal professionals. Lawyers vote for those colleagues whom they value professionally and consider particularly recommendable. Against this backdrop, SKW Schwarz being named “Law Firm of the Year” in media law is a strong signal of our reputation in the industry.
There is even more reason to celebrate: SKW Schwarz is also listed as a leading firm in numerous other areas of law – both nationally and regionally. The ranking shows that we support our clients broadly and at a high level in key future areas of business law: from data protection, IT and IP to employment law and M&A, all the way to tax and technology matters.
We would like to thank the colleagues who recommended us and our teams for their outstanding commitment. These awards motivate us to continue working on innovative solutions with high professional expertise, pragmatism, and enthusiasm.
Our awards in detail:
Law Firm of the Year
- Media Law
National: Tier 1
- Data Security and Privacy Law
- Information Technology Law
- Intellectual Property Law
- Media Law
- Tax Law
National: Tier 2
- Labor and Employment Law
- Mergers and Acquisitions Law
National: Tier 3
- Corporate Law
- Litigation
- Restructuring and Insolvency Law
Further information about our awards can be found on the Handelsblatt website.
KI-Flash: ChatGPT as a very large online search engine under the Digital Services Act
On 31 August 2026, the European Commission designated ChatGPT as a very large online search engine (VLOSE) under the Digital Services Act (DSA). It is the first designation of a generative AI service. Reddit and Roblox were classified as very large online platforms (VLOP) on the same day. All three services had reported to the Commission that they meet the threshold of 45 million average monthly users in the Union under Article 33(1) DSA. For ChatGPT, OpenAI reported around 159.1 million users of its search functions for the six-month period ending 31 March 2026.
The designation coincided closely with the launch of advertising: ads had gone live in Germany a week earlier, and self-service access through the Ads Manager opened on the same day.
This article is the second part of a three-part series on current developments around AI assistants. The first part set out the advertising and data protection standards applying to the advertising model (available here). This part looks at the obligations that follow from the designation, at the gaps the DSA may leave for advertising in AI assistants, and at the supervisory bodies that have a say alongside the Commission. Like the first part, it is addressed to companies that advertise in this environment or deploy AI assistants in their own operations. The third part deals with the responsibility and liability of advertisers and agencies.
ChatGPT as a search engine
The Commission bases the classification as a search engine on the fact that the service accesses internet content directly when answering queries. OpenAI has not contested the designation and has stated that the search function of ChatGPT operates as a search service within the meaning of the DSA. The DSA was designed for classic platforms and search engines and contains no separate category for generative systems of this kind. The Commission has therefore applied an existing framework to a new type of service.
The designation starts a four-month period (Article 33(6) DSA) which, according to the Commission, expires around the turn of the year 2026/2027. Section 5 of Chapter III DSA then applies. It covers the assessment of systemic risks under Article 34 and their mitigation under Article 35, expressly including advertising systems, as well as independent audits under Article 37, the advertisement repository under Article 39, data access for researchers under Article 40, extended transparency reporting under Article 42 and the annual supervisory fee under Article 43. Articles 37, 39 and 40 DSA, which the first part identified as starting points for verifying the provider’s promise that advertising does not influence its answers, therefore only apply from that date. For Section 5, supervisory and enforcement competence lies exclusively with the Commission.
An asymmetry in the DSA advertising rules
By its wording, Article 39(1) DSA addresses „providers of very large online platforms or of very large online search engines“. The substantive advertising requirements in Section 3, by contrast, consistently address only „providers of online platforms“: Article 25 on the design of the online interface, Article 26 on the labelling of advertising and on profiling using special categories of data, Article 27 on the transparency of recommender systems and Article 28 on the protection of minors, including the prohibition of profiling-based advertising directed at minors. On the wording, OpenAI as a VLOSE is therefore subject to the repository obligation, but not to the requirements on labelling, transparency of recommender systems, manipulative design and targeting of minors.
This literal reading is not undisputed. It is argued in the literature that Article 26 DSA applies at least to advertising-funded online search engines, and that the transparency requirements for recommender systems extend functionally to very large online search engines via Article 38 DSA. The asymmetry produces the inconsistencies described above and is accordingly the subject of ongoing debate. Advertisers and providers would be well advised not to rely on the gap in the wording holding in the long run.
It should also be noted that the Commission has designated ChatGPT as a VLOSE, but has not thereby decided that the service is not also an online platform within the meaning of Article 3(i) DSA. If it also meets the platform criteria, the provisions of Section 3 could apply in addition.
There are several starting points for that argument. Article 3(i) DSA requires a hosting service that stores information at the request of a recipient and disseminates it to the public. That applies first of all to the advertisements themselves, which the provider stores and displays on behalf of its advertising customers. It may also apply to features that allow users to make their own content publicly accessible, such as sharing individual conversations through retrievable links or offering self-configured assistants in a public directory. Whether such features qualify as a minor and purely ancillary feature within the meaning of Article 3(i) DSA determines whether the platform classification holds.
German media law is already engaged
Alongside the DSA, German authorities have been applying German media law since July 2026. On 14 July 2026, in two proceedings conducted by the state media authorities of Hamburg/Schleswig-Holstein and Berlin-Brandenburg, the Commission on Licensing and Supervision (ZAK) issued its first decisions against AI services, concerning Google’s AI Overviews and Perplexity. It found that AI answers are the providers’ own content and that the liability exemption under the DSA does not apply to them. The levers used are the diversity rules for media intermediaries under sections 91 to 94 of the Interstate Media Treaty (MStV), in particular the transparency requirement and the non-discrimination rule, which in principle presuppose the transmission of third-party information. Google has announced an appeal; the decisions are not yet final.
The proceedings concerned Google and Perplexity. Whether the reasoning can be transferred to ChatGPT is likely to depend on how source selection and linking are designed in detail. On the distinction set out in the first part, classification as a media intermediary requires that the service aggregates third-party content, selects it and determines how easily it can be found, without combining it into an overall offering of its own, which is difficult to assume for content that providers generate themselves and are liable for. It is disputed in the literature whether presenting generated answers is sufficient or whether visibly displayed third-party content with an identifiable source reference is required. An expert opinion commissioned by the state media authorities concludes that large language models are to be classified as media intermediaries to the extent that they reproduce source links within their own generated answers. That is said to apply only where the sources are not given as mere evidence, but as „further sources“, with the result that third-party content is transmitted. How that distinction is to look in practice is left open.
Two supervisory regimes side by side
If ChatGPT were both a media intermediary under sections 91 et seq. MStV and a VLOSE under the DSA, two supervisory structures would meet: the state media authorities on one side, and on the other the Commission, which is solely competent for Section 5, together with Coimisiún na Meán as Digital Services Coordinator for the remaining obligations given the Irish establishment. Between them stands the country-of-origin principle under section 3 of the Digital Services Act implementation statute (DDG) and Article 3 of Directive 2000/31/EC. Whether section 93 MStV is enforceable against providers established in another Member State has been left open by the Administrative Court of Berlin and the Higher Administrative Court of Schleswig, which referred the question to the Court of Justice of the European Union. In Germany, the Federal Network Agency also acts as Digital Services Coordinator; the lead data protection authority is the Irish Data Protection Commission.
There is also the allocation of competence under the German AI market surveillance act (KI-MIG), which the first part described for Article 50 AI Act: the Federal Network Agency is the central market surveillance authority, while for media services serving journalistic or advertising purposes the authorities competent under state law remain responsible under section 2(8) KI-MIG. The question of competence therefore needs clarification both between the Union and state level and within German supervision. We have set out the draft Interstate Treaty on Digital Media and the allocation of competence it provides for in a separate article (available here).
What the enforcement pattern shows so far
The Commission has concluded three DSA cases with a fine to date. On 5 December 2025, X was fined 120 million euros for the misleading design of its verification mark, an incomplete advertisement repository and insufficient data access for researchers, all of them verifiable transparency obligations. On 28 May 2026, a fine of 200 million euros against Temu followed, and on 20 July 2026 a fine of 550 million euros against AliExpress. In both cases the focus was not on transparency obligations but on the assessment and mitigation of systemic risks in connection with illegal, unsafe or counterfeit products. In the Temu case, according to the Commission, the risk assessment relied on general information about risks in the e-commerce sector instead of evidence relating to the service itself.
For ChatGPT, the second line may be the more informative one, because the risk assessment is among the first obligations to apply once the period expires. In the Temu case in particular, the Commission did not merely check whether an assessment had been submitted, but whether it holds up in substance. Fines may reach up to six per cent of worldwide annual turnover; the amounts imposed so far have remained well below that.
Consequences for the advertising system
The advertising system went live a week before the designation and must feed into the first systemic risk assessment before the period expires. Article 34(1)(b) and (d) DSA covers negative effects on fundamental rights, including consumer protection and the rights of the child, as well as on the protection of minors and on physical and mental well-being. Under Article 34(2) DSA, the systems for selecting and displaying advertising are among the factors to be taken into account in the risk assessment. The selection of ads by the topic of the ongoing conversation, described in the first part, should therefore be subject to that assessment, regardless of whether Article 26 DSA applies on its wording.
What comes next
Two developments are on the horizon. At Union level, the Commission is expected to propose a Digital Fairness Act in the fourth quarter of 2026, focusing on manipulative interface design, unfair personalisation and the protection of minors. At state level, the Broadcasting Commission discussed the draft of an Interstate Treaty on Digital Media (part 2) on 16 September 2026. Under that draft, providers of AI information systems are to be responsible for the content these systems generate. One option under consideration is to treat AI services as media intermediaries, another to create a new category of telemedia. The public consultation is still planned for 2026.
The expiry of the period around the turn of the year will show how the Commission assesses the risk assessment of a conversational service. Until then, the question that matters most for companies that deploy such services or advertise in them is which supervisory regime governs their own role. The third part of the series addresses that role.
If you have questions about the regulatory classification of your campaigns or of your use of AI assistants, or about what the DSA designation means for your advertising environment, we are happy to help.
Further reading:
- 20 October (Part 3): What advertisers and agencies are responsible for when booking ads in AI assistants
- 21 September (Part 1): Advertising Law and Data Protection as Ads Launch in ChatGPT
EmpCo 2026: Section 15b UWG and Existing Stock
The decision has been made just days before the EmpCo rules take effect: On 24 September 2026, the German Bundestag adopted a new Section 15b of the German Act Against Unfair Competition (UWG). For certain goods already placed on the market before 27 September 2026, the new provision
requires courts to take particular account of the principle of proportionality when assessing claims for injunctive relief relating to certain environmental claims and labels. However, the new rule does not introduce a general sell-off period.
The new EmpCo rules will apply from 27 September 2026. Until now, one of the key questions has been how to deal with goods that were already placed on the market before this date but may no longer comply with the new requirements.
The German legislator has now responded to this issue. As part of the modernisation of German design law, the Bundestag has adopted the new Section 15b UWG.
What does this mean for existing stock?
For certain EmpCo violations involving goods placed on the market before 27 September 2026, claims for injunctive relief will in future have to be assessed in accordance with the principles of good faith and proportionality.
The legislation specifically identifies four factors that are relevant to this assessment:
- the severity of the infringement;
- the company's efforts to remedy the infringement;
- the costs associated with remedying the infringement; and
- the environmental impact that would result from the measures taken.
The special provision is temporary and is scheduled to expire on 27 September 2028.
No general sell-off period
The new provision does not make an EmpCo violation automatically permissible and does not create a general transitional or sell-off period. However, it may provide significant flexibility in individual cases. According to the explanatory memorandum to the legislation, the balancing of interests may, depending on the circumstances, result in measures such as additional information requirements, a specific sell-off period for certain products, or even the exclusion of an injunctive claim altogether.
An important distinction is that the special provision does not apply generally to all goods produced before the cut-off date. It applies only to goods that had already been placed on the market before 27 September 2026.
What should companies do now?
For companies with potentially affected stock, documentation is becoming even more important. Companies should, in particular, document:
- which goods are affected;
- when they were placed on the market;
- which corrective measures have already been taken or are still possible; and
- what costs and environmental impacts would result from those measures.
For communications that can be changed quickly – such as websites, online shops or social media – the EmpCo deadline remains fully relevant. The new provision therefore does not eliminate the risk of legal disputes. It does, however, create additional arguments and potential defence options for companies.
For existing stock, the key question may therefore no longer be limited to: “Is the environmental claim permissible?”
It may also be: “Is the injunction being sought proportionate under the circumstances?”
EmpCo Compliance & Litigation
SKW Schwarz supports companies in implementing the new EmpCo requirements – from reviewing environmental and sustainability claims and addressing packaging and existing stock to defending companies against cease-and-desist claims, injunctive relief and regulatory fines.
More about our EmpCo Compliance & Litigation services (LINK)
EmpCo: Special rule planned in Germany for certain existing stock – what companies need to know now
Just days before the new EmpCo rules take effect, an important amendment to the German Act Against Unfair Competition (UWG) is taking shape. A special rule is planned for certain goods that were placed on the market before 27 September 2026. However, the proposed amendment would not introduce a general sell-through or grace period. For companies, the key priorities now are to document, prioritise and prepare for potential disputes.
On 27 September 2026, the new rules implementing the Empowering Consumers Directive (EmpCo) will take effect under the German Act Against Unfair Competition (UWG). From that date, environmental and sustainability communications will have to comply with stricter requirements.
One question is particularly pressing for companies: What happens to goods that are already on the market where the packaging contains environmental or sustainability claims that may no longer comply with the new requirements?
So far, the UWG does not provide for a general transition, grace or sell-through period for such goods. Just days before the deadline, however, an important amendment is now taking shape.
Proposed Section 15b UWG: proportionality test for claims for injunctive relief
According to a draft legislative resolution currently available, a new Section 15b UWG is to be introduced into German law.
Under the proposed provision, claims for injunctive relief based on certain EmpCo infringements relating to goods placed on the market before 27 September 2026 would have to be asserted in good faith and in accordance with the principle of proportionality.
As part of a comprehensive balancing of interests, four factors in particular would have to be taken into account:
- the seriousness of the infringement;
- the efforts made by the company to remedy the infringement;
- the costs associated with remedying the infringement; and
- the environmental impact associated with remedying the infringement.
The German Bundestag is expected to vote on the Act to Modernise Design Law on 24 September 2026, in the context of which the amendment to the UWG is, according to the information currently available, expected to be introduced. The proposed new provision has not yet been adopted.
No general sell-through or grace period
For companies, it is important to understand what the proposed rule would not do: based on the wording currently available, it would not introduce a general transition, grace or sell-through period.
Section 15b UWG-E would not automatically make an EmpCo infringement lawful. Instead, the provision is intended to make the enforcement of claims for injunctive relief in relation to certain goods already placed on the market subject to a proportionality test.
In a specific dispute, it could therefore be relevant, for example, whether a contested claim can be corrected by applying stickers or relabelling, what costs this would entail, or whether an immediate stop to distribution would result in the destruction of significant quantities of goods and the associated environmental impact.
Depending on the individual case, this balancing of interests may affect the nature and scope of injunctive relief. How the provision will be applied in practice, however, is likely to become clear only over time and, potentially, through case law.
Key distinction: “placed on the market” does not mean “produced”
One detail of the proposed wording is particularly important.
The special rule would not apply across the board to all goods produced before the deadline. Instead, it expressly refers to goods that were already placed on the market before 27 September 2026.
Companies holding significant quantities of goods or packaging should therefore carefully assess which inventory may fall within the scope of the proposed provision.
In particular, companies should now ensure that they can document when the relevant goods were placed on the market.
What companies should document now
The proposed rule makes documentation even more important. The information companies record today may later prove crucial when assessing whether injunctive relief is proportionate.
Companies should document in particular:
- Which goods are affected? Which products or packaging contain potentially problematic environmental or sustainability claims?
- When were they placed on the market? Delivery records, inventory management data and other relevant evidence should be secured without delay.
- What measures have already been taken? For example, changes to future packaging, relabelling, stickers or information provided to retailers and other distribution partners.
- What further adjustments are possible? And what organisational and economic effort would they require?
- What costs would arise? For example, from relabelling, product recalls, changes to production or, where applicable, destruction of goods.
- What would the environmental impact be? This may be particularly relevant where significant quantities of goods or packaging would otherwise have to be destroyed.
The latter four aspects in particular directly reflect the criteria that, according to the draft currently available, are to be considered as part of the proportionality assessment.
No extension for websites, online shops or social media
The proposed special rule should not be understood as a general extension of the EmpCo implementation deadline.
Based on the wording currently available, Section 15b UWG-E expressly refers to goods placed on the market before the deadline. Other forms of environmental and sustainability communication would not generally benefit from the proposed rule.
Companies should therefore continue to review and, where necessary, adapt websites, online shops, social media communications, digital campaigns and other communications that can be changed at short notice by 27 September.
EmpCo remains a litigation issue
The proposed amendment does not eliminate the risk of legal disputes.
Competitors, associations and qualified entities can take action against unlawful environmental and sustainability communications. The new provision would instead add another question to potential disputes: Is the claim for injunctive relief sought proportionate in the circumstances of the individual case?
In addition to the legal assessment of the claim itself, it may therefore become crucial how well a company has documented its existing inventory, the remedial measures already taken and the associated costs and environmental impact.
Companies should use the remaining days to focus on two areas:
1. Compliance:
Prioritise communications that can still be changed, review claims and secure the necessary supporting evidence.
2. Litigation readiness:
Document affected inventory and when it was placed on the market, assess potential remedial measures and record their economic and environmental impact.
What happens next?
The German Bundestag is expected to vote on the Act to Modernise Design Law on 24 September 2026. It remains to be seen whether the proposed Section 15b UWG will be adopted and, if so, in what final form.
For companies, the message is clear: Monitor developments – but do not wait for them.
The EmpCo deadline remains 27 September 2026. The proposed special rule could provide new arguments in the defence against claims for injunctive relief in relation to certain goods already placed on the market. However, it does not replace the need to review existing claims or to prepare for potential legal disputes.
Prioritise claims. Secure evidence. Document existing stock. Prepare for potential disputes.
EmpCo Compliance & Litigation
SKW Schwarz supports companies in implementing the new EmpCo requirements – from our EmpCo Quick Check and the legal review of environmental and sustainability claims to dealing with packaging and existing stock, as well as defending against cease-and-desist demands, claims for injunctive relief and regulatory fine proceedings.
Find out more about our EmpCo Compliance & Litigation services Click here
KI-Flash: Advertising Law and Data Protection as Ads Launch in ChatGPT
Since August 24, 2026, German ChatGPT users have also been seeing ads.
OpenAI has opened the advertising channel for 31 European markets. For users on the free Free and Go plans, ChatGPT’s functions are now available only with ads, while the Plus, Pro, Business, Enterprise and Edu plans remain ad-free according to the provider’s announcement of 18 August 2026. Ads are also shown only to logged-in users who have reached the age of majority.
One week later, on 31 August 2026, OpenAI opened self-service access through the Ads Manager for the same markets in a beta version. Advertisers based in Germany have since been able to book ads without an agency or technology partner. Booking through the provider’s ads solutions team and through agency and technology partners remains available alongside this.
Ad-funded generative AI is therefore no longer an announced plan in the German market but live operation. This article sets out the standards of review under advertising and data protection law. It is addressed to companies that advertise in this environment or deploy AI assistants in their own operations; the provider’s own obligations are described only to the extent that they matter from that perspective. No statements by the competent authorities on this advertising model are available so far.
This article opens a three-part series on current developments around AI assistants. The second part deals with the designation of ChatGPT as a very large online search engine under the Digital Services Act and the obligations attached to it. The third part asks to what extent advertisers and agencies are responsible for the content of ads placed in AI assistants and liable for the statements they make. The question of when a provider must have AI answers attributed to it as its own content was already covered in our KI-Flash of 2 July 2026.
No personalised advertising in the EEA so far
For ads on online platforms, a distinction is drawn between personalised and non-personalised advertising. The legal requirements for the two differ considerably.
In the first phase, currently implemented in the European Economic Area, ads are selected without personalisation in the sense of profiling. What is used is the topic of the ongoing conversation together with limited contextual information such as approximate location, language, time of day and device type. Earlier chats and stored information are expressly excluded according to the provider. Advertisers receive aggregated performance data only, and no conversation content, no real names and no precise location data.
Personalised advertising requires separate consent. Only then do chat history, stored information and a user’s behaviour in response to earlier ads feed into the selection. Users’ consent is required for this, as OpenAI also expressly describes in the version of its European privacy policy of 2 June 2026. This personalised advertising option has not yet been activated in the EEA.
One point that has largely gone unnoticed deserves attention here: behaviour in response to earlier ads can only feed into the selection if it has been collected beforehand, and, at least according to the provider, that does not happen in the first phase. The change therefore does not consist solely in evaluating existing data but first of all in building up a new set of data. Consent would have to cover that step as well.
How must advertising in an AI assistant be labelled?
The provider describes the ads as clearly labelled and visually separated from the answer. Under advertising law, the question is usually discussed under Section 5a(4) UWG. No. 11 of the Annex to Section 3(3) UWG may also apply, which covers the use of editorial content financed by a trader and disguised as information. That provision presupposes, however, that editorial content exists at all, and whether an AI-generated answer qualifies is an open question. For comparison portals and search engines, editorial content is in part affirmed even though there is no editorial team in the traditional sense. What speaks against that classification is precisely the position taken by the ZAK, the joint commission of the German state media authorities, according to which AI answers are the provider’s own content and therefore do not appear as neutral reporting. Added to this are Section 6(1) DDG for commercial communication in digital services and, where the service qualifies as a media intermediary or a media-like offering, Section 22 MStV. Classification as a media intermediary depends on whether the service aggregates third-party content, selects it and determines how easily it can be found. That is exactly what the ZAK relied on in relation to source citations and link lists. A service that generates only its own answers does not meet that test.
The structural risk, however, lies not in the design of the ad block but in the selection logic. An ad selected on the basis of the topic of the ongoing conversation appears at a moment when the user has just articulated a specific concern. In functional terms it works like native advertising, even where it is presented as “formally separated”. Whether a visual separation is enough to address this problem of contextual proximity is a question of the specific implementation.
Are AI answers the provider’s own content?
Against the labelling obligations under Section 22 MStV and Section 6 DDG it could be argued that a chat interface has no editorial part from which advertising would have to be distinguished in the first place. On the line that has emerged so far, that defence does not hold: in its judgment of 28 May 2026 (26 O 869/26), the Regional Court of Munich I treated a search engine’s “AI Overview” function as the provider’s own substantive statement and found that the provider had adopted the content as its own (paras. 33 f.). Three aspects were decisive: the function produces a self-contained running text that summarises, structures and evaluates search results; it forms statements that are not contained in the sources relied on; and, from the perspective of a reasonably informed average user, it appears as an answer for which the provider is responsible rather than as a neutral list of results. On 14 July 2026, in proceedings of the Hamburg/Schleswig-Holstein and Berlin-Brandenburg state media authorities, the ZAK issued its first orders against AI services operated by Google and Perplexity, holding that AI answers are the providers’ own content and that the liability exemption under the DSA does not apply. Neither decision is final and binding yet, and appeals have been announced. For Section 5a(4) UWG this preliminary question is irrelevant. For No. 11 of the Annex it matters, because editorial content is a constituent element there.
The promise about the answers
OpenAI promotes the principle that advertising does not influence the answers. Beyond being a product description, this also appears to be a statement about a material characteristic of the service within the meaning of Section 5 UWG. If the actual design departs from it – for instance through influence on ordering, product mentions or shopping integration – a misleading commercial practice would come into consideration. In practice the question of evidence arises immediately: how does a competitor prove a distortion in the model’s behaviour? How the model works lies solely within the provider’s sphere, which speaks in favour of a secondary burden of substantiation: the competitor puts forward tangible indications and the provider then has to respond in substantiated form. It can be countered that a secondary burden of substantiation is ruled out to the extent that the competitor can test the answering behaviour itself. Starting points are offered by the audit obligations under Art. 37, the ad repository under Art. 39 and researcher access under Art. 40 DSA – provisions that now apply as a result of the designation as a very large online search engine of 31 August 2026. More on this in the next article.
Who is subject to the consent requirement?
Section 25 TDDDG applies to access to information on terminal equipment through cookies. The OpenAI measurement pixel sets a first-party cookie on the advertiser’s domain. The consent requirement therefore falls not on the platform operator but on the booking party. The provider also makes a server-side interface for conversion measurement available; its use, too, is processing carried out by the booking party itself.
Section 25 TDDDG does not apply to server-side transmission, because no access to terminal equipment takes place there. The only benchmark in that respect is the GDPR.
May chat histories be used to select ads?
This is where the real point of examination lies. Chats are shared for the purpose of completing a task, not for optimising advertising. Drawing on the history for ad selection must therefore be measured against Art. 5(1)(b) and Art. 6(4) GDPR, regardless of whether consent is obtained.
Art. 9 GDPR also comes into play. Conversation histories regularly reveal health data, religious or philosophical beliefs, sexual orientation or political opinions. In Cases C-252/21 and C-446/21 the CJEU applied a broad standard for when special categories of data are involved and set strict requirements for the validity of consent. In Case C-446/21 it also found a breach of the data minimisation principle because personal data had been processed for targeted advertising purposes without any distinction according to their nature. Irrespective of this, Art. 21(2) GDPR provides an unconditional right to object to direct marketing, which is not open to any balancing exercise. The right attaches solely to the purpose of the processing and not to the legal basis. It therefore also covers the delivery of non-personalised ads to the extent that these constitute direct marketing.
Self-commitment does not replace a legal basis
The provider has set category exclusions for physical health, mental health and politics; political advertising is currently not permitted at all. Exclusions of this kind are contractual self-commitments. They replace neither a legal basis under Art. 9 GDPR nor an assessment of sector-specific advertising bans. How a prohibition under the law on advertising for medicinal products is to be enforced in an interface in which users are describing their symptoms is an open question.
The reverse case also arises. Under the provider’s advertising policies, regulated industries, among them legal, health and financial services, are excluded from booking outside the United States. For companies in these sectors, the first question is therefore not one of admissibility but one of access.
The protection of minors, too, operates through a technical self-commitment: ads are not served where the user is presumed to be a minor, as determined by age estimation. That protective measure is itself processing that calls for justification. Section 6 JMStV and No. 28 of the Annex to Section 3(3) UWG have to be taken into account in addition. Section 6 JMStV is a rule governing market conduct within the meaning of Section 3a UWG and can therefore also be enforced under unfair competition law. No. 28 of the Annex covers direct exhortations to children to buy, that is to persons under the age of fourteen. Art. 6(1)(f) GDPR comes into consideration as the legal basis for age estimation. It cannot be based on Art. 6(1)(c) GDPR to the extent that it rests on a voluntary self-commitment rather than on a specific legal obligation.
Transparency and labelling
The information obligations under Art. 12 to 14 GDPR are under particular scrutiny in 2026: on 19 March 2026 the EDPB launched a coordinated enforcement action on precisely these provisions, with 25 supervisory authorities taking part. A privacy policy revised shortly beforehand, which for the first time includes advertising as a processing purpose, therefore falls within an ongoing year of review.
Art. 50 AI Act has applied since 2 August 2026 in addition. Digital Omnibus Regulation (EU) 2026/1744 postponed only the machine-readable marking under Art. 50(2) AI Act for systems placed on the market before that date, namely to 2 December 2026. As regards competence, a distinction has to be drawn in Germany: under the KI-MIG, the Federal Network Agency is the central market surveillance authority, but for media services used for journalistic or advertising purposes competence remains, pursuant to Section 2(8) KI-MIG, with the authorities designated under state law.
What remains open for the booking party
What remains unresolved above all is which labelling obligations apply to the booking party itself, independently of how the platform operator implements them, and who is the controller under data protection law once the booking party deploys its own measurement tools. The third article in this series addresses both questions. For companies whose staff use ad-funded plans in their day-to-day work, there is the added point that conversation content feeds into ad selection there. What this means for trade secrets and for professionals bound by professional secrecy has barely been examined so far.
We would be glad to support you in reviewing your campaigns in the AI environment, in designing labelling and measurement, and in assessing the allocation of roles under data protection law.
Further reading:
- 20 October (Part 3): What advertisers and agencies are responsible for when booking ads in AI assistants
- 6 October (Part 2): ChatGPT as a very large online search engine under the Digital Services Act
The manufacture of medicines in a pharmacy
Federal Administrative Court on the Compounding of Medicinal Products in Pharmacies
In its judgment of 12 March 2026, the German Federal Administrative Court (BVerwG) clarified important issues concerning the compounding of medicinal products in pharmacies.
Dr. Oliver Stöckel analyses the decision in his latest article for GRUR-Prax. The article focuses on the requirements for prescriptions for medical practice supplies, the need to identify specific patients, and the limitation of stock preparations to a maximum of 100 patients or patient portions per day.
The decision is likely to significantly restrict the practical scope for compounding medicinal products for medical practice supplies.
Beck-Online subscribers can read the full article here (in German).
AI Flash: AI literacy Under Article 4 of the AI Act: A Look at the New (Old) Questions
Following our report on the GEMA v. Suno case in our last AI Flash, we would like to continue providing you with regular legal insights into current developments in AI law.
Today’s topic: AI literacy under Article 4 of the AI Act
Hardly any provision of the AI Regulation affects as many companies in practice as Article 4 of the AI Act on so-called “AI literacy.” It applies regardless of risk class or industry and thus to anyone who offers or operates AI systems. This is already relevant simply when using ChatGPT, Copilot, or comparable tools in everyday work. The provision has now been amended by the Digital Omnibus on AI (Regulation (EU) 2026/1744 of July 8, 2026, in effect since July 27, 2026). This is reason enough to take another detailed look at the regulation.
I. What Has Changed?
In its original version, Article 4 of the Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence (AI Act) required providers and operators to ensure, to the best of their ability, that their personnel possessed a sufficient level of AI literacy. This wording faced criticism for implying a success that companies could hardly guarantee reliably.
The Digital Omnibus on AI has made adjustments. Article 4 AI Act now states:
(1) Providers and deployers of AI systems shall take measures to support the development of AI literacy of their staff and other persons dealing with the operation and use of AI systems on their behalf, taking into account their technical knowledge, experience, education and training and the context the AI systems are to be used in, and considering the persons or groups of persons on whom the AI systems are to be used. This obligation does not require providers or deployers to guarantee any specific level of AI literacy of any individual.
(2) The Commission and the Member States shall support and facilitate the efforts of providers and deployers of AI systems, in particular SMEs, in fulfilling their obligation under paragraph 1 of this Article. For that purpose, the Commission shall publish practical examples of how to comply with that obligation on the single information platform referred to in Article 62(3), point (b).
(3) The Board shall adopt recommendations, taking into account European competence frameworks, to support the Commission and Member States in the promotion of AI literacy required under paragraph 1, including by setting out common objectives.
Thus, the obligation has shifted from "ensuring" a level of competence to supporting the development of AI literacy through appropriate measures - explicitly without guaranteeing a specific individual competence level.
Notably, what was not included in the new version of the regulation is significant: the original Commission proposal aimed to largely shift the responsibility for promoting AI literacy to the EU and the Member States. This fundamental realignment did not prevail in the trilogue. The obligation remains-albeit mitigated-with the providers and operators themselves. The only new aspect is the accompanying support from the Commission, Member States, and the AI Committee (paragraphs 2 and 3).
II. What Does "AI literacy" Actually Mean?
The term "AI literacy" is not defined in Article 4 AI Act but is elaborated in the definition provided in Article 3 No. 56 AI Act. According to this, AI literacy refers to the "skills, knowledge and understanding that allow providers, deployers and affected persons, taking into account their respective rights and obligations in the context of this Regulation, to make an informed deployment of AI systems, as well as to gain awareness about the opportunities and risks of AI and possible harm it can cause."
Thus, AI literacy is not merely technical niche knowledge but a bundle of technical understanding, risk awareness, and legal and ethical basic understanding. It addresses all actors along the AI value chain - from developers and operational staff to individuals who use AI systems on behalf of the company, such as external service providers.
Importantly for practice: Article 4 AI Act does not prescribe a specific training format, certification, or a dedicated "AI Officer." Internal training, e-learning, workshops, or external training are all permissible-what matters is that the measures fit the technical knowledge level, experience, context of use, and risk profile of the respective target group. Both the Federal Network Agency and the AI Service Center Austria of the RTR explicitly recommend documenting the measures taken (type of training, content, timing, affected groups) to demonstrate compliance with Article 4 AI Act if necessary, even though no legally mandated proof standard currently exists.
III. The (Highly Problematic) Question of Sanctions
The question remains, particularly contentious in practice: What happens if a company fails to promote AI literacy?
1. No Immediate Fine Under Article 99 AI Act
First, the good news: Article 99 AI Act lists the provisions subject to fines exhaustively. Article 4 AI Act is not mentioned there. Therefore, the regulation does not provide for an immediate fine specifically for violations of the AI literacy obligation - this is confirmed by both the Austrian AI Service Center of the RTR and the Federal Network Agency.
However, a violation is not without consequences. Some literature suggests that national market surveillance authorities - in Germany, the Federal Network Agency - can address violations of Article 4 AI Act based on national regulations with other enforcement measures. Moreover, and practically more significant, Article 4 AI Act exerts its effect mainly indirectly, through general civil and corporate law.
2. Employer Liability Under § 278 BGB
If a company uses AI systems, it bears the entrepreneurial risk as an operator and is responsible for the proper organization of operations and work equipment. If damage occurs to customers or business partners - due to incorrect operation of an AI system, unverified adoption of erroneous AI outputs, or inputting business secrets into an external AI system - the employer is liable under § 278 BGB for the fault of its employees as vicarious agents. Article 4 AI Act reinforces an existing duty of care and effectively becomes the benchmark against which the appropriateness of the organizational measures taken is assessed. If there is a complete lack of a traceable training and governance structure, the assumption of a breach of duty of care is likely.
3. Recourse Against Employees
Conversely, a company that suffers damage can seek recourse from responsible employees under the principles of internal damage compensation. Here, an interesting interaction emerges: in cases of slight negligence, the employee is typically not liable; in cases of moderate negligence, only partially; full liability generally only arises in cases of gross negligence or intent. Literature suggests that the success of a recourse claim may depend on whether the employer has fulfilled its training obligation under Article 4 AI Act. A company without a robust training concept may find itself at a disadvantage in a serious case - even with potentially gross negligence on the part of employees.
4. Liability of Management and Board
Finally, the question also concerns the management level itself. Managing directors of a GmbH (§ 43 Abs. 1 GmbHG) and board members of an AG (§§ 76, 93 Abs. 1 AktG) are obliged to take the necessary organizational measures to ensure compliance with legal behavior within the company - such as through a compliance management system that also incorporates the AI literacy obligation. If they violate this obligation culpably and the company suffers damage as a result, internal liability under § 43 Abs. 2 GmbHG or § 93 Abs. 2 S. 1 AktG may apply. The recognized business judgment rule in German law provides only limited assistance here: whether or not to establish a compliance system with a training concept is not a matter of entrepreneurial discretion but is legally mandated. Entrepreneurial discretion exists only regarding the specific design - as long as an appropriate minimum standard is maintained.
Interim Conclusion: While Article 4 AI Act is not subject to fines, it is by no means without consequences. The actual "sanctioning" occurs through the backdoor of general liability law - and this makes the norm more relevant for business practice than the absence of a fine might initially suggest.
IV. Looking Beyond the Obligation: Added Value in Practice
While the legal discussion of liability risks is certainly justified, our consulting practice with numerous in-house training sessions and workshops on AI literacy reveals another often underestimated effect: the real value does not arise only in disputes but already in the training room itself. In almost every format we have facilitated, most of the staff's open questions - from responsibility for AI outputs to handling confidential data and copyright issues - could be clarified through direct exchange.
Practical uncertainties in daily interactions with AI tools can often be resolved easily before they become actual problems. Moreover, through shared exchange, a collective awareness within the company is created. AI literacy is then not perceived as an abstract compliance requirement but as a jointly developed standard that the staff supports.
V. Conclusion and Outlook
The Digital Omnibus on AI has made Article 4 AI Act more practical without abandoning the obligation itself. The absence of a fine does not change the fact that deficiencies in AI literacy can become relevant under general civil, labor, and corporate law - for the company, for employees in recourse cases, and for the management level alike. Those who take this framework seriously and simultaneously leverage the practical value of training and workshops not only create legal certainty but also foster a sense of shared sovereignty in dealing with AI within the company.
SKW Schwarz is happy to assist you in designing suitable training programs and accompanying you in conducting initial workshops on AI literacy in your company. Please feel free to contact us so that we can jointly create the greatest possible value for your business.
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